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Abstract. We describe our experience solving the Ver-
ifyThis 2012 challenges with our program verification
tool VeriFast, including detailed explanations of our so-
lutions. We also describe some alternative solutions that
we developed after the competition.
VeriFast is a modular verifier that takes Java or C
source code annotated with function/method specifica-
tions written in a variant of separation logic, and veri-
fies that the code complies with the annotations through
symbolic execution.
1 Introduction
The first two authors of this article participated as the
VeriFast team in the VerifyThis 2012 competition [6]
held during the Formal Methods 2012 conference on 30
August 2012 in Paris, France. We used the VeriFast pro-
gram verification tool [12], a research prototype that we
have been developing since 2008. It is a modular verifier
that takes Java or C source code annotated with func-
tion/method specifications written in a variant of sepa-
ration logic, and verifies that the code complies with the
annotations through symbolic execution.
In this article, we describe our solutions to the com-
petition challenges. In the process of explaining our so-
lutions, we describe several VeriFast features that we
have not yet described in earlier published work, includ-
ing partial fixpoint function applications, parameterized
lemma function types, and quantifiers.
VeriFast distributions for Windows, MacOS X, and
Linux can be downloaded from the VeriFast website [7].
The tool ships with a test suite that includes the solu-
tions described here in the directory examples/fm2012.
While a tutorial and other materials on VeriFast are
available via the website, this article intends to be ac-
cessible to readers new to VeriFast.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we provide an overview of the VeriFast
approach. In Sections 3–5, we describe our solutions to
Challenges 1–3, respectively. We offer a conclusion in
Section 6.
2 Background: The VeriFast Approach
In this section, we give an overview of the VeriFast ap-
proach. For concreteness, we describe the approach as
applied to the C programming language; most concepts
carry over straightforwardly to the Java case.
VeriFast performs modular verification: each func-
tion is verified in isolation, using only the contracts, but
not the bodies, of other functions. Function contracts
are expressed in a variant of separation logic [13,10], a
logic for reasoning about pointer-manipulating impera-
tive programs. Separation logic is an extension of Hoare
logic [5] where assertions are interpreted with respect to
a store (which maps program variables to values) and
a heap (a partial function from allocated addresses to
values) rather than just a store. It introduces a num-
ber of additional operators into the syntax of assertions,
the most important of which are emp, stating that the
heap’s domain is empty; the points-to assertion ` 7→ v,
stating that the heap contains exactly the mapping of
address ` to value v and is otherwise empty; and the
separating conjunction P ∗Q, stating that the heap can
be split into two disjoint subheaps such that assertion P
holds for one and assertion Q holds for the other. The
proof rule for heap mutation then becomes
{` 7→ } [`] := v {` 7→ v}
where ` 7→ is shorthand for ∃v. ` 7→ v, and [`] := v is
the command that assigns the value v to the heap cell
at address `. This proof rule is applicable only if the
heap contains exactly the heap cell ` and no others. Of
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course, in general, the heap contains multiple heap cells;
to accomodate this, the proof rule can be lifted to larger
heaps using the frame rule:
{P} c {Q}
{P ∗R} c {Q ∗R}where freevars(R) ∩modifies(c) = ∅
This rule states that if a command c runs without fail-
ure when started in a state satisfying assertion P and
each post-state satisfies assertion Q, then it will also run
without failure if started in a state obtained by enlarging
the heap with a subheap that satisfies assertion R, and
furthermore the command does not modify this subheap.
(The side condition states that R does not mention any
program variables modified by c. Note that heap loca-
tions (looked up in the heap) are not considered to be
program variables (looked up in the store).)
Function contracts for functions that manipulate data
structures may hide the internal shape of the data struc-
ture by using an abstract separation logic predicate [11],
which is essentially a named, parameterized separation
logic assertion. Predicates may be recursive; their mean-
ing is defined as the least fixpoint of their definitions.
This is well-defined since recursive occurrences must oc-
cur in positive positions. Another way to look at this is to
see a predicate definition as an inductive definition with
a single inference rule. For example, the following sepa-
ration logic predicate describes a null-terminated linked
list that stores the mathematical list of values α:
predicate list(`, α) ≡
` = 0 ∧ emp ∧ α = 
∨ ∃v, t, α′. ` 7→ v ∗ `+ 1 7→ t ∗ list(t, α′) ∧ α = v · α′
where · denotes prepending an element to a list.
Encoded into VeriFast syntax, this becomes:
struct node { int value; struct node *next };
/*@
predicate list(struct node *l; list<int> values) =
l == 0 ?
values == nil
:
l->value |-> ?v &*& l->next |-> ?t &*&
malloc_block_node(l) &*&
list(t, ?values0) &*&
values == cons(v, values0);
@*/
VeriFast does not support disjunctions at the level of
separation logic assertions, because this would entail the
need for backtracking in the symbolic execution engine
(see below), which we do not do for the sake of per-
formance, predictability, and diagnosability. (However,
it does support disjunctions at the level of boolean ex-
pressions, i.e. assertions which do not mention separa-
tion logic constructs, because these are passed to the
underlying SMT solver (see below).) Therefore, we use
a conditional assertion (of the form cond ? asn1 : asn2)
as the body of the predicate. We model the contents
of the data structure using the mathematical inductive
datatype list<t> defined as follows in the library that
ships with VeriFast:
inductive list<t> = nil | cons(t, list<t>);
Separating conjunction is written as &*&. Points-to asser-
tions are written as |->. The built-in predicate malloc_-
block_node(l) denotes the permission to call free on the
pointer l; i.e. it encodes the fact that l was allocated us-
ing malloc (rather than being allocated on the stack, as
a global variable, or as part of a larger object). Veri-
Fast does not support general existential quantification;
it only supports pattern matching : arguments of predi-
cate assertions may be of the form ?x, in which case the
assertion is implicitly existentially quantified over x. This
construct binds x; its scope includes subsequent separat-
ing conjuncts. For example, the variable t bound to the
value of the next field of l in the assertion l->next |-> ?t
above is used subsequently in list(t, ?values0). This
restricted form of existential quantification enables a sim-
ple algorithm for checking assertions (see below).
VeriFast verifies each function against its contract
through symbolic execution. This is similar to what an
interpreter does, except that symbolic states are used
instead of concrete states. A single symbolic state may
represent many (even infinitely many) concrete states,
thus allowing a finite number of symbolic executions to
“cover” all potentially infinitely many concrete execu-
tions. In VeriFast, a symbolic state consists of a symbolic
store, a symbolic heap, and a path condition. The sym-
bolic store maps each local variable that is currently in
scope to its symbolic value, which is a term of first-order
logic that may contain symbols. The symbolic heap is a
multiset of heap chunks of the form p(a1, . . . , an) where
p is a separation logic predicate name (either built-in or
user-defined) and a1, . . . , an, the chunk arguments, are
terms of first-order logic. For a given interpretation of
the logical symbols that appear in the chunk arguments,
a given symbolic heap represents all concrete heaps that
satisfy the separation logic assertion obtained by tak-
ing the separating conjunction of the heap chunks, in-
terpreted as predicate assertions. The full set of concrete
states represented by a symbolic state is obtained by tak-
ing the union of the sets of represented concrete states
for all logical symbol interpretations that satisfy the path
condition, which is a set of formulae of first-order logic.
The core operations of symbolic execution are asser-
tion production and assertion consumption. Producing
an assertion that is a boolean expression evaluates the
expression under the symbolic store to yield a logical for-
mula and adds this formula to the path condition. Pro-
ducing a predicate assertion adds a corresponding chunk
to the symbolic heap. Any existentially quantified chunk
arguments are bound to fresh logical symbols. Produc-
ing a separating conjunction first produces the left-hand
side, and then produces the right-hand side. Producing
a conditional assertion forks the symbolic execution: on
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one branch, the condition is added to the path condi-
tion and the first branch’s body is produced; on the
other branch, the negation of the condition is added to
the path condition and the second branch’s body is pro-
duced.
The path condition is not actually maintained as a set
of formulae; rather, during symbolic execution, VeriFast
interacts with an SMT solver. The path condition corre-
sponds to the state of the SMT solver. Adding a formula
means “pushing” the formula into the SMT solver. If, af-
ter pushing a formula, the SMT solver reports that the
resulting set of formulae is inconsistent, VeriFast aborts
the current symbolic execution path, since it is infeasi-
ble, and continues with the next one. Aborting a sym-
bolic execution path includes “popping” the state of the
SMT solver to restore the state that existed at the most
recent branch point.
Consuming an assertion that is a boolean expres-
sion evaluates the expression under the symbolic store to
yield a formula and then asks the SMT solver to prove
that formula from the path condition; if it fails, Veri-
Fast reports an error. Consuming a predicate assertion
looks for a matching chunk in the symbolic heap. If no
match is found, an error is reported. Otherwise, existen-
tially quantified variables in the predicate assertion are
bound to the corresponding arguments of the matching
chunk and the chunk is removed from the symbolic heap.
Consuming a separating conjunction first consumes the
left-hand side, and then the right-hand side. Consuming
a conditional assertion proceeds analogously to produc-
tion.
VeriFast verifies a function by first producing its pre-
condition, then symbolically executing its body, and then
consuming its postcondition. If any heap chunks are left
in the symbolic heap after this last step, VeriFast re-
ports that the function leaks heap chunks: this indicates
a potential memory leak in the C program. Symbolic ex-
ecution of an assignment to a struct field first consumes
the heap chunk corresponding to the struct field, and
then produces the same chunk with an updated value
argument. When a struct s is allocated using malloc, for
each field f of s a chunk s f(`, vf ) is produced, where `
is a fresh symbol denoting the address where the struct
was allocated, and vf is a fresh symbol denoting the
(unspecified) initial value of the field. Additionally, a
malloc block s(`) chunk is produced, denoting that the
struct was allocated using malloc and therefore may be
freed using free. The points-to notation l->next |-> ?t
in the example above is syntactic sugar for the predicate
assertion node_next(l, ?t).
Symbolic execution of function calls proceeds by first
consuming the callee’s precondition and then producing
its postcondition. Notice that this approach implicitly
applies separation logic’s frame rule: any heap chunks
that exist at the call site and that are not consumed by
the precondition remain available to the caller in their
original state. In our experience, this approach, involv-
ing mostly just pattern matching, performs much better
than verification condition generation-based approaches
where the frame condition must be encoded into the in-
put to the SMT solver using quantifiers that range over
all memory locations, stating that all locations not de-
clared as modified by the callee remain unchanged.
Sometimes, the symbolic heap must be rewritten into
an equivalent form. For example, if the symbolic heap
contains just the chunk list(l, values), and we wish
to access the value field of the first node of l, we need
to open the list chunk. This means replacing the chunk
with its definition. The converse operation is closing a
chunk, which consumes the chunk’s definition and pro-
duces the chunk itself. In general, VeriFast does not
open or close chunks automatically, again to preserve
predictable and diagnosable performance. Rather, the
user must insert open and close ghost commands into
the code. However, if a predicate is marked precise, by
inserting a semicolon between its input parameters and
its output parameters, VeriFast will attempt to automat-
ically open and close it when appropriate, provided the
values of the input arguments are known. A predicate is
precise if, for a given valuation of the input arguments
and for a given heap, there is at most one subheap and at
most one valuation of the output arguments that satisfy
the predicate.
For modeling and reasoning about data, such as the
contents of the linked list in the example above, the Veri-
Fast approach is oriented towards inductive datatypes
and primitive recursive functions (called fixpoint func-
tions) over these. An example of the former is the list<t>
datatype, and an example of the latter is the length func-
tion, defined as follows in the library that ships with
VeriFast:
fixpoint int length<t>(list<t> xs) {
switch (xs) {
case nil: return 0;
case cons(x, xs0): return 1 + length(xs0);
}
}
Like in proof assistants that support primitive recursive
functions such as Isabelle/HOL [9] and Coq [1], a fix-
point function’s body must be a case split over one of
its arguments (called its inductive argument), and each
recursive call must structurally decrease this argument;
i.e. the callee’s value for this argument must be a com-
ponent of the caller’s. In the example, the recursive call
length(xs0) is allowed because xs0 is a component of xs.
Inductive datatypes and fixpoint functions have a sim-
ple and clear mathematical meaning; they are expres-
sive enough for most purposes; and we can offer well-
defined and predictable automated reasoning for them:
in principle, only reduction occurs automatically. Reduc-
tion equates a fixpoint function call whose inductive ar-
gument is a constructor with the body of the correspond-
ing case in the function’s definition. VeriFast is purposely
incomplete: it does not automatically perform case splits
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or induction. The goal is to preserve predictable perfor-
mance. The reasoning is implemented by encoding the
inductive datatypes and fixpoint functions into the back-
ground theory of the SMT solver using uninterpreted
function symbols and axioms for injectiveness and dis-
jointness (but not exhaustiveness) of constructors and
for reduction of fixpoint functions.
While no automatic induction occurs for reasoning
about inductive datatypes or separation logic predicates,
manual induction is supported by writing lemma func-
tions: a lemma function is like a regular C function, ex-
cept that it is defined within an annotation and VeriFast
checks that it has no side-effects and that it terminates.
VeriFast supports a number of termination arguments;
the most important ones are structural induction on an
inductive argument and induction on the derivation of a
separation logic predicate. The latter is based on the fact
that each non-built-in chunk was produced from built-in
chunks by a finite number of close operations. For ex-
ample, an inductive proof of the fact that the length of
a list is always nonnegative can be given in VeriFast as
follows:
lemma void length_nonnegative<t>(list<t> xs)
requires true;
ensures 0 <= length(xs);
{
switch (xs) {
case nil:
case cons(x, xs0):
length_nonnegative(xs0);
}
}
Then, to obtain this fact for a given specific inductive
list value, one can either call this lemma explicitly as
a ghost command, or one can declare the lemma as a
lemma_auto, in which case the lemma is passed as an ax-
iom to the SMT solver and applied automatically. This
introduces a risk of degraded performance or nontermi-
nation of the SMT solver; we leave this responsibility to
the user. Note: only autolemmas whose contract does not
involve separation logic constructions are passed to the
SMT solver; others are applied by the symbolic execu-
tion engine during chunk production and consumption.
As will be illustrated by the challenge solutions be-
low, the VeriFast approach for verifying properties of an
imperative program often comes down to using separa-
tion logic to establish a correspondence between the im-
perative program and a pure functional version of it, and
then separately verifying the desired properties with re-
spect to the pure functional program, the latter in ways
very similar to how one develops theories in proof assis-
tants like Coq and Isabelle/HOL. This stands in some
contrast with approaches that are oriented less towards
inductive datatypes and fixpoint functions and more to-
wards quantifier-rich specifications, which tend to lead to
more direct statements and proofs of the desired prop-
erties, but for which it might be harder to offer a pre-
dictable, diagnosable, well-performing proof authoring
experience. We believe no one particular approach cur-
rently being proposed in the verification community is a
clear winner, and each has important benefits and con-
tributions, and as the community grows to understand
better the various trade-offs involved we will learn how
to combine the various approaches to best tackle partic-
ular types of problems.
3 Challenge 1: Longest Common Prefix
3.1 Challenge
Essentially, the challenge was to specify and verify the
functional correctness of the following C function, which,
given an array of integers a of length N, returns the length
of the longest common prefix of the subarrays starting
at indices x and y.
int lcp(int *a, int N, int x, int y) {
int l = 0;
while (x + l < N && y + l < N
&& a[x + l] == a[y + l])
l++;
return l;
}
(We did not, either during or after the competition,
attempt to solve the part marked Advanced of the chal-
lenge, which was to verify a program that computes the
longest repeated substring of a given string.)
3.2 Competition Solution 1
The first solution that we came up with during the com-
petition is shown in Figure 1.1
The solution consists of the C function definition
given in the challenge (transformed slightly; see below),
augmented with VeriFast annotations. These take the
form of C comments marked with an @ sign.
The specification of the C function consists of a pre-
condition, given by the requires clause, and a postcon-
dition, given by the ensures clause. The precondition
states that the function must receive read permission to
elements 0, inclusive, through N, exclusive, of the array
a, and that arguments x and y are within appropriate
bounds. In VeriFast, a function’s precondition must re-
quire access permissions for all memory locations that
the function accesses, except for the ones that it allo-
cates itself or for which it obtains permission through
some other means (such as acquiring a mutual exclu-
sion lock). In particular, to write to a memory location,
1 The only differences with the actual submitted code are 1)
that this version uses an improved notation for array permissions
which was introduced in the December 2012 release of VeriFast,
and 2) that we removed some ghost statements that turned out to
be superfluous.
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/*@
fixpoint int lcp_<t>(list<t> xs, list<t> ys) {
switch (xs) {
case nil: return 0;
case cons(x, xs0): return
switch (ys) {
case nil: return 0;
case cons(y, ys0): return x == y ? 1 + lcp_(xs0, ys0) : 0;
};
}
}
@*/
int lcp(int *a, int N, int x, int y)
//@ requires [?f]a[0..N] |-> ?elems &*& 0 <= x &*& x < N &*& 0 <= y &*& y < N;
//@ ensures [f]a[0..N] |-> elems &*& result == lcp_(drop(x, elems), drop(y, elems));
{
int l = 0;
for (;;)
//@ requires [f]a[0..N] |-> elems &*& 0 <= l &*& x + l <= N &*& y + l <= N;
/*@
ensures
[f]a[0..N] |-> elems &*& l - old_l == lcp_(drop(x + old_l, elems), drop(y + old_l, elems));
@*/
//@ decreases N - l;
{
if (!(x + l < N && y + l < N && a[x+l] == a[y+l])) {
/*@
if (x + l == N) { drop_length(elems); }
else if (y + l == N) {
assert drop(x + l, elems) == cons(_, _);
drop_length(elems);
} else {
drop_n_plus_one(x + l, elems);
drop_n_plus_one(y + l, elems);
}
@*/
break;
}
//@ drop_n_plus_one(x + l, elems);
//@ drop_n_plus_one(y + l, elems);
l++;
}
return l;
}
Fig. 1. Our first competition solution to Challenge 1
full permission is required; to only read from a memory
location, some fractional permission [2] is sufficient. A
full permission can be split into a number of fractional
permissions and later reassembled into a full permission.
Each fractional permission has a coefficient, a rational
number between 0, exclusive, and 1, inclusive. (A coef-
ficient of 1 denotes a full permission.) The coefficient, if
not 1, is written inside a pair of brackets preceding the
permission. The notation [?f] denotes that an arbitrary
fraction is sufficient, and binds the actual coefficient to
ghost variable f.
The precondition also binds the contents of the spec-
ified array elements, represented as a value of the ghost
type list<int>, to the ghost variable elems. The ghost
variables bound in the precondition are in scope in the
postcondition. This allows the postcondition to specify
that the function returns the same fractional permission
f that it received, and that the return value of the func-
tion is the longest common prefix of the sublists of elems
obtained by dropping the first x and y elements, respec-
tively. The longest common prefix of two lists is specified
using the fixpoint function lcp_ defined recursively in the
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annotation preceding the C function. This function uses
an extended switch notation to perform a case analysis
on the list values passed in as arguments. Type list
is defined inductively in the built-in VeriFast header file
list.h as follows:
inductive list<t> =
nil | cons(t head, list<t> tail);
A list of elements of type t is either empty (denoted
by constructor nil) or non-empty, with a first element
(called the head) of type t and a remainder (called the
tail) of type list<t>. As another example of a fixpoint
function, the function drop used in the postcondition is
defined in list.h as follows:
fixpoint list<t> drop<t>(int n, list<t> xs) {
switch (xs) {
case nil: return nil;
case cons(x, xs0): return
n == 0 ? xs : drop(n - 1, xs0);
}
}
Since the list type that we use to model the con-
tents of the array is defined inductively, and the func-
tions lcp_ and drop used in the specification are defined
recursively, a recursive implementation of the C function
would have been closer to the specification and there-
fore easier to verify. However, the implementation given
in the challenge is iterative. Applying the classical loop
verification proof rule here, with a loop invariant, would
be somewhat painful. However, an alternative proof rule
for loops was proposed recently [14] that allows a loop to
be verified as if it was a tail-recursive function. We have
implemented this proof rule in VeriFast; specifically, for
annotating a loop, the user can choose to provide a loop
contract instead of a loop invariant. For example, the
loop
while (C)
//@ requires P;
//@ ensures Q;
{ B }
is verified by VeriFast as if it was a call of a local function:
void iter()
//@ requires P;
//@ ensures Q;
{ if (C) { B iter(); } }
iter();
We have applied this feature in the solution. However,
applying this feature means that VeriFast checks that
the loop postcondition holds when the loop ends (i.e.,
when C is false). This means that the postcondition must
follow from the conjunction of the precondition and the
negation of the loop condition. In general, however, Veri-
Fast cannot prove this implication without help. Helping
VeriFast means inserting extra ghost statement annota-
tions, such as lemma applications and case splits. But
in the case of a regular while loop, there is no way for
the user to insert ghost code between the start of the
loop iteration and the exit from the loop. For our solu-
tion, to work around this problem we rewrote the given
function body slightly: we moved the condition check
into the body of the loop using an if statement and a
break statement; this gave us the opportunity to insert
ghost statements between the point where the negation
of the loop condition is established and the point where
the loop is exited (and where VeriFast checks that the
postcondition holds). Schematically, we rewrote our loop
into the form
for (;;)
//@ requires P;
//@ ensures Q;
{
if (!C) {
//@ ... ghost code ...
break;
}
B
}
which is verified as if it was of the form
void iter()
//@ requires P;
//@ ensures Q;
{
if (!C) {
//@ ... ghost code ...
return;
}
B
iter();
}
iter();
The loop contract in our solution is similar to the
function contract, except that the postcondition states
that the loop “returns” the length of the longest com-
mon prefix of the subarrays starting at x + old_l and
y + old_l, where old_l denotes the value of variable l
at the start of the current loop “call” (i.e. the imaginary
call of the tail-recursive function). The “return value” is
embodied in the difference between the new value of l
and the old value of l. Notice that this contract is in-
deed appropriate: a) it is established by the base case,
i.e. when the loop exits; b) given that the contract holds
for a “tail-recursive call” of the loop, it holds for the
“caller”; c) the loop contract implies the function con-
tract, considering that the initial value of l is 0 and that
the function returns the final value of l.
Proving the cases (a) and (b) required a number of
ghost statements. For case (a), the case distinction that
happens in the loop condition had to be repeated in the
annotations, and for each case, additional ghost code was
necessary to establish the loop postcondition. Specifi-
cally, if x + l == N, the postcondition follows from the
fact that drop(x + l, elems) equals nil, but the latter
fact is not immediately obvious to VeriFast since it re-
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quires an inductive proof, which VeriFast does not at-
tempt to construct. The solution is to call a lemma func-
tion that provides this fact in its postcondition. Such a
lemma function, called drop_length, is declared in header
file list.h as follows:
lemma void drop_length<t>(list<t> xs);
requires true;
ensures drop(length(xs), xs) == nil;
The second case of the loop condition, where x +
l != N but y + l == N, can be dealt with similarly, by
another call of drop_length to show that drop(y + l,
elems) equals nil, except that we also need to perform
a case split on drop(x + L, N), since otherwise VeriFast
will not reduce the first switch expression in the body
of lcp_. (VeriFast never performs case splits implicitly,
since this can easily lead to performance degradation and
even non-termination of the verifier.) This case split is
provoked by asserting that drop(x + l, elems) matches
the pattern cons(_, _). Such a pattern-matching asser-
tion is checked by doing a case split and checking that
all non-matching cases lead to absurdity.
The final subcase of case (a) is the case where the cor-
responding array elements are unequal. From this fact,
which is expressed in terms of the elems list as nth(x + l,
elems) != nth(y + l, elems), VeriFast must derive that
the lcp_ function goes into the last branch of its body.
For this to happen, VeriFast must see that drop(x + l,
elems) and drop(y + l, elems) are nonempty (i.e. they
match cons(_, _)) and that their first elements are nth(x
+ l, elems) and nth(y + l, elems). This is what the
calls of the drop_n_plus_one lemma provide, which is de-
clared in list.h as follows:
lemma void drop_n_plus_one<t>(int n, list<t> xs);
requires 0 <= n &*& n < length(xs);
ensures drop(n, xs) ==
cons(nth(n, xs), drop(n + 1, xs));
For the case (b) where the loop does not end, i.e. the
recursive case, we need to prove that the call of lcp_
also hits its recursive case. Similarly to the last sub-
case of (a), this is accomplished with two calls of lemma
drop_n_plus_one.
3.3 Competition Solution 2
The second solution we came up with during the com-
petition is shown in Figure 2.2
As in our first solution, the precondition of lcp de-
mands read permission to the first N elements of a, and
requires that x and y lie within proper bounds. The
postcondition returns the requested permissions to the
caller. However, the relation between the function’s re-
turn value and the elements of the array is described in
2 The only differences with the actual submitted code are 1)
that this version is written in C instead of Java, 2) that it uses
the improved notation for array permissions as before, and 3) that
quantifiers are expressed via forall instead of forall nth.
a more declarative style. More specifically, the postcon-
dition states 1) that the return value lies within proper
bounds, 2) that the subarrays of a starting at x and y
share a common prefix of length result, and 3) that no
longer common prefix exists. In the first solution, these
properties can be derived from the definition of the func-
tion lcp_ (for example, via a lemma).
The second property of result is expressed via a uni-
versal quantifier: for all integers i in the range 0 (inclu-
sive) to result (exclusive), the element at index x + i
is equal to the one at y + i. Interestingly, this form of
bounded quantification is not built into VeriFast. In-
stead, the specification library quantifiers.gh partially
shown in Figure 3 declares the higher-order function
forall. This function takes a list vs and a property p
(of type fixpoint(t, bool), which is VeriFast notation
for the function type t → bool of functions that take a
value of type t as an argument and return a value of type
bool) as arguments, and returns whether each element
of vs satisfies p. In addition to the function itself, the li-
brary provides two lemmas, get_not_forall_witness and
apply_forall, that can be used by clients to reason about
forall. The former lemma returns an element of vs that
does not satisfy p, provided forall(vs, p) does not hold.
The latter lemma states that each member of the list sat-
isfies p if forall(vs, p) holds.
One might reasonably try to express the fact that the
sublists of list elems at offsets x and y have a common
prefix of length result through an expression like
forall(range(0, result), fixpoint(int i) { return
nth(x + i, elems) == nth(y + i, elems); })
where fixpoint(T x) {return E;} would denote an anony-
mous fixpoint function that maps arguments x to results
E. However, VeriFast currently does not support anony-
mous fixpoint functions. Therefore, the quantifier in the
specification of lcp uses the fixpoint sublists_equal_at-
_offset to state the desired property. This function is
partially applied to elems, x and y in order to obtain
a function from integers to booleans (as required by
forall).
A disadvantage of providing quantification as a li-
brary is that VeriFast is often unable to automatically
discharge proof obligations involving quantifiers. In such
cases, the tool relies on the user to complete the proof (by
inserting ghost code, which typically calls lemmas). For
example, consider the body of the loop in Figure 2. The
ghost statements in the body are crucial for VeriFast to
be able to deduce that the loop preserves the loop invari-
ant. In particular, they prove that the quantifier holds for
range(0, l). They do so by contradiction: assume that
the quantifier does not hold, and derive absurdity. The
absurdity proof in the solution first obtains the index of
an element for which the quantifier does not hold, and
then proceeds by case analysis on whether the element
is the last one or not. If not, absurdity follows from the
fact that the quantifier holds for range(0, l - 1); oth-
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/*@
fixpoint bool sublists_equal_at_offset(list<int> elems, int x, int y, int i) {
return nth(x + i, elems) == nth(y + i, elems);
}
@*/
int lcp(int *a, int N, int x, int y)
//@ requires [?f]a[0..N] |-> ?elems &*& 0 <= x &*& x < N &*& 0 <= y &*& y < N;
/*@ ensures [f]a[0..N] |-> elems &*&
0 <= result && result <= N - x && result <= N - y &&
forall(range(0, result), (sublists_equal_at_offset)(elems, x, y)) == true &*&
x + result == N || y + result == N || nth(x + result, elems) != nth(y + result, elems); @*/
{
int l = 0;
while (x + l < N && y + l < N && a[x + l] == a[y + l])
/*@ invariant [f]a[0..N] |-> elems &*& 0 <= l &*& x + l <= N &*& y + l <= N &*&
forall(range(0, l), (sublists_equal_at_offset)(elems, x, y)) == true; @*/
//@ decreases N - l;
{
l++;
/*@
if (!forall(range(0, l), (sublists_equal_at_offset)(elems, x, y))) {
int i = get_not_forall_witness(range(0, l), (sublists_equal_at_offset)(elems, x, y));
if (i < l - 1)
apply_forall(range(0, l - 1), (sublists_equal_at_offset)(elems, x, y), i);
}
@*/
}
return l;
}
Fig. 2. Our second competition solution to Challenge 1
erwise, it follows from the fact that the loop condition
holds.
VeriFast also supports native quantifiers, in the form
of forall_(int i; E) expressions. By native, we mean
that these quantifiers are encoded as quantifiers in the
underlying SMT solver (instead of as applications of the
uninterpreted function symbol forall). After the com-
petition, we also solved the first challenge making use of
such native quantifiers. In particular, the call of forall in
the loop invariant in Figure 2 is replaced in this solution
by:
forall_(int i; i < 0 || l <= i ||
sublists_equal_at_offset(elems, x, y, i))
and similarly in the postcondition. The key advantage of
native quantifiers is that the SMT solver can automat-
ically discharge many proof obligations involving such
quantifiers, and therefore that the developer needs to
provide fewer annotations to help the tool complete the
proof. For example, the ghost statements in the body
of the loop in Figure 2 can be omitted when using na-
tive quantifiers. However, in our experience relying on
native quantifiers also has a number of disadvantages.
In particular, the time needed by the SMT solver to
discharge proof obligations involving general quantifiers
(and even whether it can discharge the proof obligation
at all) can be extremely sensitive to minor changes to
the program and the specifications. As a consequence, it
can be hard to diagnose (and remedy) the exact cause
of a verification failure. For example, when we tried to
make use of native quantifiers to solve the first chal-
lenge during the competition (the postcondition was ex-
pressed directly in terms of function nth, without us-
ing auxiliary function sublists_equal_at_offset), veri-
fication failed; later diagnosis indicated that the SMT
solver’s heuristics for instantiating quantifiers failed to
produce the required instantiations. Rewriting the quan-
tifier using function sublists_equal_at_offset was suf-
ficient to make the proof go through.
4 Challenge 2: Prefix Sum
4.1 Challenge
The challenge was essentially to specify and verify func-
tional correctness of an algorithm for computing the pre-
fix sums of a given array of integers, expressed in Java in
Figure 4: When method prefixSums returns, the element
of array a at index i should contain the sum of the initial
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fixpoint bool forall<t>(list<t> xs, fixpoint(t, bool) fp) {
switch (xs) {
case nil: return true;
case cons(x, xs0): return fp(x) && forall(xs0, fp);
}
}
lemma t get_not_forall_witness<t>(list<t> vs, fixpoint(t, bool) p);
requires !forall(vs, p);
ensures mem(result, vs) == true &*& !p(result);
lemma void apply_forall<t>(list<t> vs, fixpoint(t, bool) p, t x);
requires forall(vs, p) == true &*& mem(x, vs) == true;
ensures p(x) == true;
Fig. 3. Part of quantifiers.gh, a specification library for quantification. Fixpoint function mem(x, xs) checks if list xs contains element
x.
void upsweep(int[] a, int left, int right) {
if (right > left+1) {
int space = right - left;
upsweep(a, left-space/2, left);
upsweep(a, right-space/2, right);
}
a[right] = a[left]+a[right];
}
void downsweep(int[] a, int left, int right) {
int tmp = a[right];
a[right] = a[right] + a[left];
a[left] = tmp;
if (right > left+1) {
int space = right - left;
downsweep(a, left-space/2, left);
downsweep(a, right-space/2, right);
}
}
void prefixSums(int[] a) {
upsweep(a, a.length/2-1, a.length-1);
a[a.length - 1] = 0;
downsweep(a, a.length/2-1, a.length-1);
}
Fig. 4. Prefix sum algorithm of Challenge 2
values of elements 0 through i−1, for all i, provided that
the length of the array is a power of two greater than 1.
4.2 Competition Solution
A cleaned version of the solution we submitted during
the competition is shown in Figures 5 and 6.
Our specification for method prefixSums requires in
its precondition that the array can be described using
the separation logic predicate tree0. tree0(a, l, r, t) says
that l < r and array a stores the leaves of the complete
binary tree t in elements s through r with s = r + 1 −
2(r− l). That is, l is the index of the element storing the
rightmost leaf of the left subtree of t and r is the index
of the element storing the rightmost leaf of the right
subtree of t. For the precondition of method prefixSums,
this means that the length of array a must be a power of
two greater than 1, and its contents are bound to ghost
variable values in the form of a value of type tree that
is complete (i.e. all leaves are at the same depth). Type
tree is defined at the top of our solution.
The postcondition states that when the method re-
turns, the array contents are described by the fixpoint
function prefix_sums applied to values, with initial value
0 of the accumulator. This function, defined earlier in
the solution, returns the list of prefix sums of the values
stored in the given binary tree, incremented by the given
accumulator value.
To explain the proof of method prefixSums, we first
explain the specification and proof of methods upsweep
and downsweep, and of lemma function tree2_prefix_-
sums.
The specification of method upsweep requires that
when the method is called, the array must be described
by predicate tree0, as described above. It ensures that
when the method returns, the array is described by pred-
icate tree1 with the same arguments, except that the
rightmost element is separately specified to contain the
sum of the initial values of the relevant elements of the
array. tree1(a, l, r, t) states that l < r, that t is a com-
plete binary tree with 2(r− l) leaves, and that the array
element at index s+ i− 1 contains the sum of the leaves
of the largest subtree of t for which t’s i’th leaf is the
rightmost leaf, where s = r + 1 − 2(r − l) as before,
for all 1 ≤ i < 2(r − l). The rightmost element (the
element at index r) is not described by the tree1 predi-
cate; this prevents the predicate from encapsulating the
permission required for the array element assignments in
upsweep and prefixSums.
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/*@
inductive tree = leaf(int) | node(tree, tree);
predicate tree0(int[] a, int left, int right, tree values) =
right > left + 1 ?
tree0(a, left - (right - left) / 2, left, ?lvalues) &*&
tree0(a, right - (right - left) / 2, right, ?rvalues) &*&
values == node(lvalues, rvalues) &*&
right - left == (right - left) / 2 * 2
:
a[left] |-> ?l &*& a[right] |-> ?r &*& values == node(leaf(l), leaf(r)) &*&
right == left + 1;
fixpoint int sum(tree t) {
switch (t) {
case leaf(n): return n;
case node(n1, n2): return sum(n1) + sum(n2);
}
}
predicate tree1(int[] a, int left, int right, tree values) =
right > left + 1 ?
tree1(a, left - (right - left) / 2, left, ?lvalues) &*& a[left] |-> sum(lvalues) &*&
tree1(a, right - (right - left) / 2, right, ?rvalues) &*&
values == node(lvalues, rvalues) &*&
right - left == (right - left) / 2 * 2
:
a[left] |-> ?l &*& values == node(leaf(l), leaf(_)) &*&
right == left + 1;
predicate tree2(int[] a, int left, int right, int leftSum, tree values) =
right > left + 1 ?
tree2(a, left - (right - left) / 2, left, leftSum, ?lvalues) &*&
tree2(a, right - (right - left) / 2, right, leftSum + sum(lvalues), ?rvalues) &*&
values == node(lvalues, rvalues) &*&
right - left == (right - left) / 2 * 2
:
a[left] |-> leftSum &*& a[right] |-> ?r &*& values == node(leaf(r - leftSum), leaf(_)) &*&
right == left + 1;
fixpoint list<int> prefix_sums(int leftSum, tree b) {
switch (b) {
case leaf(n): return cons(leftSum, nil);
case node(t1, t2): return append(prefix_sums(leftSum, t1), prefix_sums(leftSum + sum(t1), t2));
}
}
lemma void tree2_prefix_sums()
requires tree2(?a, ?left, ?right, ?leftSum, ?values);
ensures a[left + 1 - (right - left)..right + 1] |-> prefix_sums(leftSum, values);
{
open tree2(_, _, _, _, _);
if (right > left + 1) {
tree2_prefix_sums();
tree2_prefix_sums();
}
}
@*/
Fig. 5. Our competition solution to Challenge 2 (Part 1 of 2)
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class PrefixSumRec {
public static void upsweep(int[] a, int left, int right)
//@ requires tree0(a, left, right, ?values);
//@ ensures tree1(a, left, right, values) &*& a[right] |-> sum(values);
{
//@ open tree0(_, _, _, _);
if (right > left+1) {
int space = right - left;
upsweep(a,left-space/2,left);
upsweep(a,right-space/2,right);
}
a[right] = a[left]+a[right];
//@ close tree1(a, left, right, values);
}
public static void downsweep(int[] a, int left, int right)
//@ requires tree1(a, left, right, ?values) &*& a[right] |-> ?leftSum;
//@ ensures tree2(a, left, right, leftSum, values);
{
//@ open tree1(_, _, _, _);
int tmp = a[right];
a[right] = a[right] + a[left];
a[left] = tmp;
if (right > left+1) {
int space = right - left;
downsweep(a,left-space/2,left);
downsweep(a,right-space/2,right);
}
//@ close tree2(a, left, right, leftSum, values);
}
public static void prefixSums(int[] a)
//@ requires a != null &*& tree0(a, a.length / 2 - 1, a.length - 1, ?values);
//@ ensures a[..] |-> prefix_sums(0, values);
{
upsweep(a, a.length / 2 - 1, a.length - 1);
a[a.length - 1]=0;
downsweep(a, a.length / 2 - 1, a.length - 1);
//@ tree2_prefix_sums();
}
public static void main(String[] args)
//@ requires true;
//@ ensures true;
{
int [] a = {3,1,7,0,4,1,6,3};
//@ close tree0(a, 0, 1, _);
//@ close tree0(a, 2, 3, _);
//@ close tree0(a, 1, 3, _);
//@ close tree0(a, 4, 5, _);
//@ close tree0(a, 6, 7, _);
//@ close tree0(a, 5, 7, _);
//@ close tree0(a, 3, 7, _);
prefixSums(a);
//@ assert a[..] |-> {0,3,4,11,11,15,16,22};
}
}
Fig. 6. Our competition solution to Challenge 2 (Part 2 of 2)
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For the verification of the body of upsweep, all that
was required was an explicit unfolding of predicate tree0
and an explicit folding of predicate tree1. This is because
the definition of the predicates matches closely the struc-
ture of the code.
The specification of downsweep requires in its precon-
dition the state as it is left by upsweep, except that the
value of a[right] is not constrained, and ensures that
when the method returns, the relevant part of a is de-
scribed by the predicate tree2. tree2(a, l, r, p, t) states
that l < r, that t is a complete binary tree with 2(r− l)
leaves, and that the element of array a at index s+ i− 1
contains the sum of p and the first through i − 1’th
leaf of t, where s = r + 1 − 2(r − l) as before, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ 2(r − l).
Similarly to the proof of upsweep, the proof of the
function downsweep only requires an explicit unfolding
of predicate tree1 and an explicit folding of predicate
tree2, again because the predicate definitions have been
chosen to coincide with the structure of the code.
Finally, the lemma tree2_prefix_sums is used to show
that predicate tree2 does indeed imply the prefix sums
property. The proof is by straightforward induction on
the derivation of the tree2 predicate.
5 Challenge 3: Iterative Deletion in a Binary
Search Tree
5.1 The Challenge
The challenge was to specify and verify functional cor-
rectness of the following algorithm that removes the min-
imum element from a binary search tree:
typedef struct tree {
struct tree *left;
int data;
struct tree *right;
} *Tree;
(Tree, int) search_tree_delete_min(Tree t) {
Tree tt, pp, p;
int m;
p = t->left;
if (p == NULL) {
m = t->data; tt = t->right; dispose(t);
t = tt;
} else {
pp = t; tt = p->left;
while (tt != NULL) {
pp = p; p = tt; tt = p->left;
}
m = p->data; tt = p->right; dispose(p);
pp->left = tt;
}
return (t, m);
}
5.2 Competition Solution
The most challenging part of this task is the specification
of the loop: the loop “returns” three pointers that point
deep inside a tree data structure, and then the code after
the loop modifies the tree through these pointers. The
information provided by the loop specification should
be sufficient to prove that the piece of code after the
loop is safe, establishes the correct function result, and
maintains the well-formedness of the binary search tree.
A cleaned-up version of the solution that we submit-
ted during the competition is shown in Figures 7–8.
Before we describe how we addressed the loop spec-
ification problem, we first explain how we specified the
function.
The function’s precondition uses separation logic pred-
icate Tree (not to be confused with program type Tree)
to specify that pointer t must point to a well-formed tree
data structure, and to bind its contents to ghost variable
vs. Furthermore, it requires that the tree be non-empty,
and that it receive permission to write to the pointers r1
and r2. The postcondition states that in the post-state
r1 points to some pointer tresult which itself points to
a well-formed tree data structure whose contents can be
obtained by deleting the leftmost leaf of vs; furthermore,
r2 points to the value of this leaf.
Notice that the data structure contents are specified
as a value of inductive datatype tree, which specifies a
precise tree shape, including the address of each node.
While this does not break information hiding (since the
predicate Tree need not comply with the shape infor-
mation specified by the tree value; indeed, it could ig-
nore all information except for the set of data values
contained in the nodes), this is not a particularly clean
choice. However, given the time constraints, we chose a
datatype that would facilitate the proof of the body of
the function.
The Tree predicate chosen for this particular proof
does in fact follow the shape of the given tree value.
As for the proof of the body of the function, the case
where the root of the tree is the leftmost node is trivial.
We concentrate on the other case.
To address the abovementioned loop specification prob-
lem, for this solution we chose to have the loop return a
“magic wand”. A magic wand or separating implication
P →∗ Q is a separation logic permission that means as
much as “Q except for P”, i.e. one can derive Q given
both P and P →∗ Q:
P ∗ (P →∗ Q)⇒ Q
Our loop returns a magic wand that says: if you give me
the left field of pp updated with the correct new value,
then I will give you the tree data structure, well-formed,
in its new state where the minimum element has been
deleted. Indeed, when the loop ends, the tree is in the
desired state, except that the left field of pp must still
be updated to point to the right-hand child of p.
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/*@
inductive tree = empty | node(Tree, tree, int, tree);
fixpoint tree delete_min(tree t) {
switch (t) {
case empty: return empty;
case node(p, t1, v, t2): return t1 == empty ? t2 : node(p, delete_min(t1), v, t2);
}
}
fixpoint int min_value(tree vs) {
switch (vs) {
case empty: return 0;
case node(p, t1, v, t2): return t1 == empty ? v : min_value(t1);
}
}
fixpoint Tree p_(tree t) {
switch (t) {
case empty: return 0;
case node(p, l, v, r): return p;
}
}
predicate Tree(Tree t; tree vs) =
t == 0 ?
vs == empty
:
t->left |-> ?l &*& Tree(l, ?vsl) &*& t->right |-> ?r &*& Tree(r, ?vsr) &*&
t->data |-> ?v &*& malloc_block_tree(t) &*& vs == node(t, vsl, v, vsr);
predicate Tree_r(Tree t; int v, tree rvs) =
t->data |-> v &*& malloc_block_tree(t) &*& t->right |-> ?r &*& Tree(r, rvs);
lemma_auto void Tree_inv()
requires Tree(?t, ?vs);
ensures Tree(t, vs) &*& t == p_(vs);
{ open Tree(_, _); }
typedef lemma void fill_hole_lemma(predicate() pred, Tree t, tree vs, Tree pp, Tree r)();
requires pred() &*& pp->left |-> r;
ensures Tree(t, delete_min(vs));
@*/
Fig. 7. Our competition solution for Challenge 3 (Part 1 of 2)
VeriFast does not have built-in support for magic
wands. However, it supports lemma function pointers
and parameterized lemma function types. Together, these
features allow us to encode magic wands into VeriFast.
Specifically, VeriFast supports lemma function type
definitions of the following form:
typedef lemma rt lft(tpt1 tp1, ..., tptN tpN)
(pt1 p1, ..., ptM pM);
requires P;
ensures Q;
This defines a lemma function type lft with return type
rt, lemma function type parameters tp1 through tpN,
lemma function parameters p1 through pM, precondition
P, and postcondition Q. Both the lemma function type
parameters and the lemma function parameters may ap-
pear in the precondition and the postcondition. Given
this lemma function type definition, we can assert that
some lemma function lf complies with the type, instan-
tiated with particular values v1 through vN for the lemma
function type parameters, using a ghost command of the
form
produce_lemma_function_pointer_chunk(lf)
: lft(v1, ..., vN)(p1, ..., pM)
{ G1 call(); G2 };
where G1 and G2 are optional sequences of ghost com-
mands (such as open or close commands or lemma func-
tion calls) to aid in deriving the lemma function pre-
condition from the lemma function type precondition
and the lemma function type postcondition from the
lemma function postcondition, respectively. This ghost
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void search_tree_delete_min(Tree t, Tree *r1, int *r2)
//@ requires Tree(t, ?vs) &*& vs != empty &*& *r1 |-> _ &*& *r2 |-> _;
//@ ensures *r1 |-> ?tresult &*& Tree(tresult, delete_min(vs)) &*& *r2 |-> min_value(vs);
{
//@ open Tree(_, _);
if (t->left == 0) { /*@ open Tree(0, _); @*/ *r2 = t->data; *r1 = t->right; free(t); } else {
Tree pp = t; Tree p = pp->left; Tree tt = p->left;
for (;;)
/*@ requires Tree(pp, ?vs_) &*& vs_ == node(pp, ?lvs, ?v, ?rvs) &*&
lvs == node(p, ?llvs, _, ?rlvs) &*& tt == p_(llvs); @*/
/*@ ensures p->left |-> _ &*& p->data |-> min_value(vs_) &*& p->right |-> ?r &*&
malloc_block_tree(p) &*&
is_fill_hole_lemma(_, ?pred, old_pp, vs_, pp, r) &*& pred() &*& pp->left |-> p; @*/
{
//@ { open Tree(pp, _); open Tree(p, _); open Tree(tt, _); }
if (tt == 0) {
/*@ {
predicate P() = Tree_r(pp, v, rvs) &*& Tree(p_(rlvs), rlvs);
lemma void lem()
requires P() &*& pp->left |-> p_(rlvs);
ensures Tree(pp, delete_min(vs_));
{ open P(); }
produce_lemma_function_pointer_chunk(lem) : fill_hole_lemma(P, pp, vs_, pp, p_(rlvs))()
{ call(); };
close P();
} @*/
break;
}
pp = p; p = tt; tt = p->left;
//@ recursive_call();
//@ assert is_fill_hole_lemma(?lem0, ?P0, _, _, ?pp_, ?r);
/*@ {
predicate P() =
Tree_r(old_pp, v, rvs) &*& old_pp->left |-> old_p &*&
is_fill_hole_lemma(lem0, P0, p_(lvs), lvs, pp_, r) &*& P0();
lemma void lem()
requires P() &*& pp->left |-> r;
ensures Tree(old_pp, delete_min(vs_));
{
open P();
lem0();
leak is_fill_hole_lemma(_, _, _, _, _, _);
}
produce_lemma_function_pointer_chunk(lem) : fill_hole_lemma(P, old_pp, vs_, pp_, r)()
{ call(); };
close P();
} @*/
}
*r1 = t; *r2 = p->data; tt = p->right; free(p); pp->left = tt;
//@ assert is_fill_hole_lemma(?lem, _, _, _, _, _);
//@ lem();
//@ leak is_fill_hole_lemma(_, _, _, _, _, _);
}
}
Fig. 8. Our competition solution for Challenge 3 (Part 2 of 2)
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command produces a lemma function pointer chunk of
the form is_lft(lfp, v1, ..., vN) where lfp is a pointer
to the lemma function. (Of course, since lemma functions
do not really exist in memory at run time, the pointer
is not really a memory address but is just a value that
identifies the lemma function.) Once we have a lemma
function pointer chunk, we can perform a lemma func-
tion pointer call:
assert is_lft(?lfp, _, ..., _);
lfp(w1, ..., wM);
We first bind the lemma function pointer to ghost vari-
able lfp and then perform a function call through that
pointer, passing the arguments for the lemma function
parameters. When encountering a lemma function pointer
call, VeriFast checks that a lemma function pointer chunk
exists in the symbolic heap. It then uses the values for
the lemma function type parameters found in the chunk
and the values for the lemma function parameters found
in the call itself to instantiate the lemma function type
precondition and postcondition, and finally uses the re-
sulting contract to verify the call (by consuming the pre-
condition and then producing the postcondition).
Our challenge solution defines the parameterized lemma
function type fill_hole_lemma. Our loop returns a pointer
to a lemma function that implements this type, instan-
tiated appropriately.
The loop is again specified using a loop contract
(see our discussion of our competition solution for Chal-
lenge 1 above). A particular “call” of the loop operates
on the subtree pointed to by the current value of pp:
given such a subtree, it returns the permissions for the
fields of the node to be deleted (sufficient to deallocate
the node) as well as the permission to update the left
field that needs to be updated, and a magic wand (the
combination of a lemma function pointer call permission
is_fill_hole_lemma(...) and a function-specific permis-
sion pred() holding the specific permissions required by
the lemma to perform its duty) that can be used after
the update to obtain the Tree permission describing the
properly updated subtree at the old value of pp.
The code after the loop simply needs to call the re-
turned lemma. To do so, it first uses an assert statement
to bind the lemma function pointer (which is the first ar-
gument of the lemma function pointer call permission)
to ghost variable lem. After the call, we use the leak com-
mand to acknowledge that we are consciously leaking the
lemma function pointer call permission since we will not
be using it further; this keeps VeriFast from reporting a
leak error.
The body of the loop consists of two cases: either we
have found the node to be deleted, or we need to continue
our descent. In the former case, we define a lemma lem
and an accompanying predicate P that reassembles the
subtree at pp given the right-hand section of pp (i.e. ev-
erything except the left field and the left subtree, repre-
sented by predicate Tree_r) and the right-hand subtree
of p. We then use a produce_lemma_function_pointer-
_chunk command to generate a lemma function pointer
call permission. This command generates a proof obliga-
tion that the lemma’s contract implies the lemma func-
tion type’s contract, appropriately instantiated. Any ghost
commands required to discharge this proof can be writ-
ten before or after the call(); statement inside the ghost
code block accompanying the command.
If we have not yet found the node to be deleted, we
update the loop variables and perform the imaginary
recursive call of the loop. (Note: in our competition so-
lution for Challenge 1, the recursive call was implicitly
inserted at the end of the loop body. Here we specify
it explicitly so that we can insert ghost commands af-
ter the recursive call to derive the caller’s postcondition
from the callee’s postcondition.) After the recursive call,
we take the magic wand lem0 returned by the recursive
call (which operates on the subtree at p) and use it to
build a new magic wand lem that operates on the subtree
at pp.
5.3 Post-competition Solution
During the competition, we worked on an alternative
approach for the third challenge. However, we did not
manage to fully work out this solution in the allotted
time, and we completed it only after the competition.
It is shown in Figures 7 (shared with our competition
solution), 9, and 10.
The loop in the function search_tree_delete_min it-
erates over the left pointers until it finds the leftmost
node in the tree. The key idea of this solution is that in
each iteration the entire tree can be decomposed into a
“tree with a hole” at pp (describing the part of the tree
up to, but not including, the node at pp and its descen-
dants) and another, complete tree starting at pp. Indeed,
the loop invariant of Figure 10 states exactly this prop-
erty.
To describe trees with a hole, we introduce the pred-
icate Tree_with_hole (shown in Figure 9). The body of
this predicate is similar to the body of Tree of Figure 7
except that the recursion stops when t equals hole (in-
stead of when t is zero). The fixpoint merge fills the hole
in a tree t1 by plugging in another tree t2.
A single iteration of the loop moves pp, p and tt down
one node in the tree. The lemma move_hole states that
doing so preserves the loop invariant. After the loop,
the leftmost node is deleted from the tree. The lemma
plug_hole is then used to recombine the tree with a hole
and the tree at pp into a single tree, as required by the
postcondition.
The predicate Tree_with_hole was inspired by the
predicate lseg which is commonly used in separation
logic proofs about linked lists. lseg(n1, n2, vs) holds if
there exists a sequence of nodes from n1 up to (but not
including) n2 which contains the data values vs. In other
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/*@
predicate Tree_with_hole(Tree t, Tree hole; tree vs) =
hole != 0 &*&
t == hole ?
vs == empty
:
t != 0 &*& t->left |-> ?l &*& Tree_with_hole(l, hole, ?vsl) &*&
t->right |-> ?r &*& Tree(r, ?vsr) &*&
t->data |-> ?v &*& malloc_block_tree(t) &*&
vs == node(t, vsl, v, vsr);
fixpoint tree merge(tree t1, tree t2) {
switch(t1) {
case empty: return t2;
case node(p, l, v, r): return node(p, merge(l, t2), v, r);
}
}
lemma void move_hole(Tree t);
requires Tree_with_hole(t, ?hole, ?vs1) &*& Tree(hole, node(hole, ?left, ?v, ?right)) &*& p_(left) != 0;
ensures Tree_with_hole(t, p_(left), merge(vs1, node(hole, empty, v, right))) &*& Tree(p_(left), left) &*&
merge(vs1, node(hole, left, v, right)) == merge(merge(vs1, node(hole, empty, v, right)), left);
lemma void plug_hole(Tree t1, Tree t2);
requires Tree_with_hole(t1, t2, ?vs1) &*& Tree(t2, ?vs2);
ensures Tree(t1, merge(vs1, vs2));
lemma void delete_min_merge(tree t1, tree t2);
requires t2 != empty;
ensures merge(t1, t2) != empty &*& delete_min(merge(t1, t2)) == merge(t1, delete_min(t2)) &*&
min_value(merge(t1, t2)) == min_value(t2);
@*/
Fig. 9. Our post-competition solution for Challenge 3 (Part 1). The bodies of the lemmas have been omitted from this article.
words, lseg(n1, n2, vs) describes a linked list with a
hole at n2.
The function contract of search_tree_delete_min shown
in Figure 10 only states that the function deletes the left-
most node in the tree and that it returns the value stored
in this node. In our actual implementation, we addition-
ally prove that the resulting tree is a binary search tree,
if the tree was a binary search tree on entry to the func-
tion.
6 Conclusion
For each of the three challenges issued during the compe-
tition, we were able to submit a solution. Moreover, the
function contracts we came up with for each challenge
are complete in the sense that they specify full functional
correctness of the program at hand.
The annotation overhead and verification time re-
quired for each solution are shown in Table 1. While the
annotation overhead ranges from 3 up to 7 lines of an-
notations per line of code, each solution verifies in less
than one second.
Table 1. Table showing the lines of code (LOC), lines of anno-
tations (LOA), annotation overhead, and the verification time re-
quired for each solution. The experiments were executed on a Mac-
Book Pro with a 2.53 GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 4 GB of
memory running Ubuntu Linux 12.04.1 LTS. The data in this ta-
ble was gathered by running VeriFast from the command-line with
the -stats option using Z3 [3] 2.3 to discharge proof obligations.
Note that the lines of code and annotations only include the solu-
tion file itself; specification libraries that ship with VeriFast (such
as list.gh) are not included in the measurements.
solution LOC LOA overhead time
LCP sol. 1 7 26 371% 0.13s
LCP sol. 2 5 16 320% 0.03s
PrefixSum 29 194 669% 0.28s
TreeDel sol. 1 20 102 510% 0.09s
TreeDel sol. 2 18 114 633% 0.09s
In hindsight, we believe three key features of Veri-
Fast enabled us to solve the challenges within the limited
competition time frame: (1) the existing specification
libraries, (2) fast verification and (3) separation logic.
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void search_tree_delete_min(Tree t, Tree* r1, int* r2)
//@ requires Tree(t, ?vs) &*& vs != empty &*& *r1 |-> _ &*& *r2 |-> _;
//@ ensures *r1 |-> ?tresult &*& Tree(tresult, delete_min(vs)) &*& *r2 |-> min_value(vs);
{
Tree tt, pp, p;
int m;
//@ open Tree(t, vs);
p = t->left;
if (p == 0) {
//@ open Tree(p, _);
m = t->data; tt = t->right; free (t); t = tt;
} else {
pp = t; tt = p->left;
while (tt != 0)
/*@ invariant Tree_with_hole(t, pp, ?vs1) &*& Tree(pp, ?vs2) &*& vs2 == node(pp, ?lvs, _, _) &*&
lvs == node(p, ?llvs, _, _) &*& p_(llvs) == tt &*& vs == merge(vs1, vs2);
@*/
{
//@ open Tree(pp, vs2);
//@ open Tree(pp->left, _);
pp = p; p = tt; tt = p->left;
//@ move_hole(t);
}
//@ open Tree(pp, _);
//@ open Tree(pp->left, _);
//@ open Tree(tt, _);
m = p->data; tt = p->right; free(p); pp->left = tt;
//@ plug_hole(t, pp);
//@ delete_min_merge(vs1, vs2);
}
*r1 = t;
*r2 = m;
}
Fig. 10. Our post-competition solution for Challenge 3 (Part 2)
First of all, VeriFast ships with a number of specifica-
tion libraries. In all our solutions, we reused definitions
and lemmas provided by these libraries. For example,
list.gh defines the function drop and offers a number of
lemmas such as drop_n_plus_one and drop_length about
this function that we reused in our first solution to Chal-
lenge 1. Secondly, VeriFast typically offers feedback on
a verification attempt in under a second. This allowed
us to stay focussed on the particular sub-problem at
hand without losing time waiting for an answer from
the verifier. Finally, the third challenge involves specify-
ing a function operating on a tree. Thanks to separation
logic, we were able to concisely specify the structure of
the tree. Moreover, separation logic allowed us to rea-
son locally: if a code fragment demands access only to
a particular sub-tree, client code can safely assume that
the fragment does not invalidate properties that hold for
contexts containing that sub-tree (provided the context
is disjoint from the sub-tree).
In the future, we plan to extend the automation in
VeriFast such that additional ghost statements (such as
lemma calls and open/close statements) can be inferred
to reduce the annotation overhead. A key challenge in
designing such an extension is keeping verification times
low. Also, any inference algorithm will be incomplete, so
we will need to provide ways for the user to supply hints.
We have participated in two other verification com-
petitions in the past: the First [8] and Second [4] Verified
Software Competitions. We did as follows: in the first, we
were tied with all other participants; in the second, we
were not among the medalists: we ended up in “Rank 8”
with a score of 570/600. In the end, a team’s result in
a verification competition of course depends not only on
the “quality” of the tool and the approach, but also on
the “shape” that the team members are in at the time
of the competition, and to a large extent on random
factors (i.e. “luck”). Still, during this latest competition
we benefited from new features recently introduced into
VeriFast, most prominently constructor patterns (e.g.
xs == cons(_, _)) and local predicates (e.g. predicates
P in Figure 8), which, while not theoretically extending
the power of VeriFast’s logic, saved us some time, typing,
and brain cycles.
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We enjoyed the competition very much and from the
ensuing discussions we learned a great deal about the
other verification approaches; we gratefully acknowledge
the significant efforts by the organizers to bring about
this successful outcome.
Acknowledgments
This research is partially funded by the Research Fund
KU Leuven, and by the EU FP7 project NESSoS. With
the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight
against Crime Programme of the European Union (B-
CCENTRE). Jan Smans is a postdoctoral fellow of the
Fund for Scientific Research Flanders (FWO). We ac-
knowledge support from Microsoft Research Cambridge
as part of the Verified Software Initiative.
References
1. Yves Bertot and Pierre Caste´ran. Interactive Theorem
Proving and Program Development: Coq’Art: The Calcu-
lus of Inductive Constructions. Springer, 2004.
2. Richard Bornat, Cristiano Calcagno, Peter O’Hearn, and
Matthew Parkinson. Permission accounting in separation
logic. In POPL, 2005.
3. Leonardo de Moura and Nikolaj Bjørner. Z3: An efficient
smt solver. In C. R. Ramakrishnan and Jakob Rehof, edi-
tors, TACAS, volume 4963 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 337–340. Springer, 2008.
4. Jean-Christophe Filliaˆtre, Andrei Paskevich, and Aaron
Stump. The 2nd verified software competition: Expe-
rience report. In Vladimir Klebanov and Sarah Gre-
bing, editors, COMPARE2012: 1st International Work-
shop on Comparative Empirical Evaluation of Reasoning
Systems, Manchester, UK, June 2012. EasyChair.
5. C.A.R. Hoare. An axiomatic basis for computer pro-
gramming. CACM, 12(10), 1969.
6. Marieke Huisman, Vladimir Klebanov, and Rose-
mary Monahan. The VerifyThis 2012 website.
http://fm2012.verifythis.org/, 2012.
7. Bart Jacobs, Jan Smans, and Frank
Piessens. The VeriFast website.
http://distrinet.cs.kuleuven.be/software/VeriFast/, 2013.
8. Vladimir Klebanov, Peter Mu¨ller, Natarajan Shankar,
Gary T. Leavens, Valentin Wu¨stholz, Eyad Alkassar,
Rob Arthan, Derek Bronish, Rod Chapman, Ernie Co-
hen, Mark Hillebrand, Bart Jacobs, K. Rustan M. Leino,
Rosemary Monahan, Frank Piessens, Nadia Polikarpova,
Tom Ridge, Jan Smans, Stephan Tobies, Thomas Tuerk,
Mattias Ulbrich, and Benjamin Weiß. The 1st Verified
Software Competition: Experience report. In Michael
Butler and Wolfram Schulte, editors, Proceedings, 17th
International Symposium on Formal Methods (FM), vol-
ume 6664 of LNCS. Springer, 2011.
9. Tobias Nipkow. Interactive proof: Introduction to Is-
abelle/HOL. In O. Grumberg, T. Nipkow, and B. Haupt-
mann, editors, Software Safety and Security, pages 254–
285. IOS Press, 2012.
10. Peter O’Hearn, John Reynolds, and Hongseok Yang. Lo-
cal reasoning about programs that alter data structures.
In CSL, 2001.
11. Matthew Parkinson and Gavin Bierman. Separation
logic and abstraction. In POPL, 2005.
12. Pieter Philippaerts, Jan Tobias Mu¨hlberg, Willem Pen-
ninckx, Jan Smans, Bart Jacobs, and Frank Piessens.
Software verification with VeriFast: Industrial case stud-
ies. Science of Computer Programming, 2013.
13. John C. Reynolds. Separation logic: A logic for shared
mutable data structures. In LICS, 2002.
14. Thomas Tuerk. Local reasoning about while-loops. In
VSTTE Theory Workshop, 2010.
